Nariné Ghazaryan, Assistant Professor in International and European Law, Radboud University Nijmegen

Photo credit: Alexander Naumov, via Wikimedia Commons

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war ceasefire agreement, brokered by Russia, was seen with skepticism by close observers of the region. By mid-2021, attacks on Armenian territory made it evident that the ceasefire was unstable. This prompted the EU to take a leading role in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This leadership involved high-profile mediation by European Council President Charles Michel, focusing on prisoner exchanges, discreet diplomatic initiatives, and a series of high-level trilateral meetings throughout 2021 and 2022. The August 2022 trilateral meeting fostered optimism about the EU’s potential to help the parties find common ground and resolve their long-standing disputes. However, in a move undermining the EU’s efforts, Azerbaijan launched a significant military offensive against Armenia in September 2022, seizing parts of its territory and prompting new accusations of war crimes. Despite these developments, the EU’s immediate response was restrained, prioritizing continued diplomatic engagement, leading to another high-level meeting at the Prague summit in October 2022.

By then, Armenia had formally requested international presence within its borders from various international organizations. In a constructive response, the EU rapidly deployed a temporary CFSP border mission to Armenia. However, challenging the EU’s mediation efforts, Azerbaijani President Aliyev soon voiced his opposition to the mission, stating that Azerbaijan would not allow its deployment on Azerbaijani territory. While the mission’s duration was subsequently extended, its presence did not prevent further hostilities within Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh.

The November 2020 trilateral statement stipulated that a Russian peacekeeping contingent would ensure the safety of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this presence failed to prevent subsequent attacks. Instead, these events reinforced concerns about Russia’s genuine commitment to conflict resolution. The lack of intervention by Russian forces when Azerbaijani ‘eco-activists’ blocked the Lachin corridor in December 2022, the sole land route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and its economic lifeline, was a clear breach of the trilateral statement. This inaction strongly suggests that the blockade would have been impossible without tacit approval from Russia. While Russia’s image as Armenia’s security guarantor had already been tarnished, the Lachin corridor events appear to be an attempt to pressure Armenia, which has been seeking closer ties with the EU, the US, and the broader international community. Threats to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh could destabilize Armenia politically, jeopardizing its pro-Western government. The fate of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population rests precariously in the hands of the Russian military and the Azerbaijani government, with its ingrained Armenophobia. While EU representatives issued statements urging Azerbaijan to guarantee free passage through the Lachin corridor, there was no indication of a concrete EU response should Azerbaijan fail to comply.

Several months into the blockade, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed Azerbaijan’s responsibility for the Lachin corridor’s closure. In its interim order, the ICJ directed Azerbaijan to ensure the unhindered movement of people, vehicles, and goods in both directions through the Lachin Corridor in the Armenia v. Azerbaijan case concerning alleged violations of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). As in previous instances, the EEAS spokesperson urged Azerbaijan to comply with the ICJ order without suggesting potential consequences for non-compliance. Notably, only the European Parliament, in a subsequent resolution, called for imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan should it fail to implement the ICJ’s order. Defying the ICJ ruling and international calls for action, Azerbaijan not only kept the road blocked but escalated the situation in April 2022 by abandoning the pretense of environmental activism and establishing a military checkpoint at the Lachin corridor. Moreover, attacks on Armenian territory and soldiers continued despite the EU border mission’s presence. Disturbingly, the EU border mission is consistently absent from the vicinity of these events, possibly due to its reliance on prior coordination with Azerbaijan for its movements.

Within this context, it is evident that Azerbaijan lacks genuine interest in a peace treaty with Armenia. The international community’s focus on the war in Ukraine allows Azerbaijan to exploit its 2020 victory, staking claims in southern Armenia and potentially setting the stage for the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians. Given its diplomatic engagement over the past two years and the deployment of the CFSP mission in Armenia, the question arises: what is the EU’s next move? Should it confine itself to its current mediation role, or should it utilize other political and legal tools at its disposal, including sanctions?

Despite leading trilateral talks to advance the peace process, the EU’s approach is still shaped by its historically cautious engagement and its persistent “both-sides-ism”. This perspective essentially regarded Armenia and Azerbaijan as equally responsible for the conflict and equally inflexible in resolving it. While this view might have held some weight in the past, it is no longer tenable after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, considering the vulnerability of Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, empowered by its close relationship with Russia, the sole international actor with a military presence in the region, is ready to exploit this vulnerability. Azerbaijan’s position has been further strengthened by a new energy agreement reached with the EU in the summer of 2022. The EU’s understandable desire to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels appears to lead it into alliances with other authoritarian regimes. In her speech marking the deal, which promises a doubling of gas supplies to the EU, Commission President von der Leyen called Azerbaijan a “trustworthy partner”, overlooking its political track record and threats to Armenia’s territorial integrity.

The EU should not ignore the blockade of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, now solidified by a military checkpoint established in violation of the ICJ order. This recent gas deal, which empowers Azerbaijan, provides the EU with considerable leverage that should be used to lift the blockade and avert the ethnic cleansing of Karabakh Armenians. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the EU’s capacity to react decisively to blatant breaches of international law through various sanctions and a firm stance. Appeasing the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan suggests that lessons from the EU’s past dealings in its eastern neighborhood have not been learned. There, accommodating Putin’s regime only emboldened his aggression. The EU should suspend its partnership with Azerbaijan and any potential for a new agreement unless Azerbaijan shows a genuine commitment to the peace process, aiming for a solution based on the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population. The EU must address how to protect the safety and rights of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, given Azerbaijan’s undemocratic governance, poor human rights record, and long-standing Armenophobia. Considering its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the inadequate performance of Russian forces, the EU is well-positioned to deploy a European peacekeeping contingent.

Above all, the EU must use its political, legal, and economic influence to take a principled stand when International Law is undeniably violated. Overlooking such violations to secure energy interests will only result in further preventable crises on the EU’s periphery.