Frances Webber, a lawyer, journalist, and lecturer, holds significant roles as the vice chair of the Institute of Race Relations and as co-editor for prominent legal publications. She is also the author of “Borderline Justice: the fight for refugee and migrant rights”.
The European Union (EU) aims to control refugee flows through its new system for relocating refugees from Italy and Greece. This system includes a strict screening process at entry points, seemingly designed to separate a small number of “deserving” refugees from those deemed “undeserving” economic migrants, who the EU seeks to deport quickly. However, this approach is overly simplistic. The screening at these “hotspots” could lead to many individuals being returned to unsafe conditions without their claims being properly assessed.
The European Commission states that at these “hotspots”, EU agencies, including Frontex, Europol, and the EU asylum agency, will assist national authorities in Italy and Greece. Their tasks include identifying, fingerprinting, screening, and registering asylum seekers, transferring eligible applicants to other member states, and removing those who either did not apply for asylum or are no longer permitted to stay. Although some organizations view this framework positively, hoping for a more organized system, concerns remain about the nature of these hotspots. There are questions about their appearance, whether they will function as detention centers, and how decisions will be made and reviewed.
Who benefits?
Council decisions indicate that only nationalities with a 75% or higher recognition rate for refugee or protection status will be considered for relocation. As highlighted by legal expert Steve Peers, those eligible (currently mainly Syrians, Iraqis, and Eritreans) will be assigned new locations without choice, although family units must be kept together. Conversely, host countries can express preferences for the types of asylum seekers they are willing to accept. This system clearly disadvantages certain groups. Those relocated won’t be able to move to more desirable locations and face swift return to their assigned country if they attempt to do so.
While Peers addresses the broader relocation issues, this piece focuses on the screening process and the fate of those not selected. Will there be tests to verify nationalities? The EU Commission indicates that Frontex already has screening and “debriefing” experts in Italy and Greece, likely seconded officials from member states, focused on uncovering smuggling routes. Will their priority be identifying deception rather than addressing needs? What documents will be examined? Will a valid Syrian, Iraqi, or Eritrean passport, for instance, be mandatory for acceptance? If not, how will nationality be determined? Given the flawed language and knowledge tests used in the UK to assess asylum seekers’ nationality, what appeal mechanisms will be available for those deemed to be falsely claiming a specific nationality?
What about those not from the primary refugee-producing nations? The hotspots seem intended to process all international protection claims not resulting in relocation. If so, will individuals remain there throughout the process? If not, where and how will they live while their claims are processed? What will the process and timeline look like? The urgency within these camps might hinder the thorough and compassionate assessment of claims, as emphasized in the 1979 UNHCR Handbook. What procedures will be followed? Most importantly, what appeal options exist for those facing rejection?
The ‘safe countries’ list
To expedite decisions, the Commission proposes a regulation establishing a “safe countries of origin” list, including Balkan nations (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia) and Turkey. While not equating to automatic rejection, this list creates a strong presumption of safety, leading to an accelerated process. However, as seen in the UK’s now-suspended “detained fast-track” system, this approach often results in unfair rejections. The Commission acknowledges that most of these countries are unsafe for Roma, LGBTI individuals, other minorities, and, in Turkey’s case, Kurds, journalists, and political dissenters. As Steve Peers argues, Turkey’s inclusion is unwarranted, given that nearly a quarter of asylum applications from Turkish citizens are successful.
Accelerated removals
Without fair and effective procedures, or if the hotspots prove ineffective gateways to protection or lead to relocation to hostile countries, why would those needing protection even apply? While the Council decisions clearly state that only those seeking protection are eligible for relocation, Frontex’s mandate includes removing those with exhausted claims and those who haven’t even applied. Does this mean Frontex officers can apprehend anyone in Italy and Greece who hasn’t registered an asylum claim? The right to seek asylum should be available up until the point of removal, but how will this be ensured?
Without clear and robust safeguards, the EU’s relocation program could become a guise for mass deportations instead of offering protection to those arriving in Europe.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 26
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