Laura Robbins-Wright

PhD Candidate in Government, London School of Economics and Political Science

On December 15, 2015, the European Commission put forward a suggestion for a program to offer humanitarian entry to Syrian refugees residing in Turkey. This proposal follows earlier EU initiatives, including a plan to relocate refugees within the EU and a program for resettling refugees from other countries. It also builds upon an action plan from October 2015 and a more recent decision to give €3 billion to a Refugee Facility designed to better coordinate aid for Syrian refugees in Turkey. The recommendation calls for a swift, effective, and voluntary system to ensure these individuals arrive in an organized, secure, and respectful manner.

This recommendation raises several points worthy of deeper examination. Firstly, the Commission emphasized the need to show support for Turkey, as it currently hosts over 2.2 million Syrian refugees. However, while Turkey accommodates the highest number of Syrian refugees overall, Jordan and Lebanon shoulder a proportionally greater burden. Syrian refugees represent about 3% of Turkey’s population, but they make up roughly 10% of Jordan’s population and over 20% of Lebanon’s. The decision to prioritize humanitarian entry for refugees in Turkey might stem from the shared border between Turkey and the EU, and the numerous refugees who have braved the dangerous journey across the Aegean Sea to Greece. Additionally, Turkey is in the process of joining the EU, while Jordan and Lebanon are merely considered part of the wider ‘European neighborhood.’ Although discussions about Turkey joining the EU began in 2005 and have moved slowly, this new collaborative approach to migration could potentially improve refugee protection and reinvigorate these intricate discussions.

Secondly, the proposal stresses the voluntary aspect of participating in this scheme. The Commission stated that all EU member states, along with members of Schengen, are welcome to take part in this humanitarian entry program. This approach aligns with previous EU relocation initiatives, notably EUREMA I and II. Allowing member states to choose whether or not to participate isn’t surprising given the difficulties the Commission encountered in securing agreement on national quotas for the intra-EU relocation plan proposed last summer. In this context, recent media reports suggest that EU Migration Commissioner Dimitri Avromopoulos has admitted that “relocation does not work.” Data released on January 20, 2015, supports this statement, revealing that member states pledged slightly over 4,200 places (significantly less than the Commission’s goal of 160,000), and only 331 individuals have been relocated from Greece and Italy thus far.

The goal of demonstrating global solidarity aligns with the concept of international cooperation outlined in the 1951 Convention. However, this voluntary approach, coupled with the evident lack of enthusiasm for the latest relocation plan, raises a longstanding question: can the EU truly achieve a unified approach to humanitarian protection?

Lastly, the recommendation stands out for its strategic approach, particularly its aim to achieve a “lasting decrease” in irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has, since 2003, tried to reframe resettlement as a strategic tool for protection. This approach emphasizes the direct and indirect benefits of resettlement for refugees, host nations, receiving nations, and the global refugee protection system. However, the organization also acknowledged the importance of preventing such programs from inadvertently encouraging further migration. The UNHCR suggested that establishing clear and open selection criteria can help achieve this. In this case, the Commission has suggested that only those who officially registered with Turkish authorities before November 29, 2015, will be eligible for humanitarian entry. The Commission also recommends that participating countries evaluate the reasons behind an individual’s flight from Syria and consider their vulnerability, potential family connections within the EU, and other factors.

While managing this humanitarian entry program strategically could encourage Turkey to continue receiving asylum seekers and allow some Syrians to access international protection, questions remain about how Turkey will handle future arrivals. Moreover, the UNHCR has pointed out that offering a permanent solution to certain refugees might create “bitterness and resentment” among groups who are ineligible, particularly if these groups lack access to effective protection in the host country. This raises concerns about how the potential decision to grant humanitarian protection to Syrian refugees will be perceived by the many Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi refugees who have lived in Turkey for a long time and may wait up to 10 years for a decision on their own protection applications.

Although the recommendation provides clear operational instructions, it doesn’t specify how many refugees can or should be offered protection through this proposed plan. Instead, the Commission suggests determining the number of individuals offered admission based on UNHCR processing capacity, the number of displaced people in Turkey, and the impact of initiatives aimed at reducing irregular migration to Turkey (a measure that has drawn criticism from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). Additionally, the Commission has recommended that participating member states admit those granted subsidiary protection fairly. However, given the previously mentioned difficulties the Commission experienced in getting member states to agree on quotas for the intra-EU relocation program, this might prove tougher than anticipated. It remains uncertain whether this humanitarian entry program, if implemented, will meaningfully impact the large number of Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:5

Photo credit: www.unhcr.org