The initial ruling by the CJEU on integration requirements for third-country nationals.

Steve Peers

The Court of Justice recently addressed whether Member States can mandate integration courses for immigrants in the case of P and S, which involved the EU Directive on long-term residence for non-EU citizens. This decision has broader implications because similar integration requirements exist in other EU directives, such as the one concerning family reunification for non-EU citizens. However, it’s important to note that EU free movement law does not allow Member States to impose such conditions on EU citizens or their families. Similarly, the EU-Turkey association agreement doesn’t include such provisions for Turkish nationals, although Member States might implement them with some limitations.

The heart of this judgment lies in interpreting the wording of the long-term residence Directive. This directive states that Member States have the right to “require third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with national law.” The case involved non-EU citizens who already held long-term resident status under this Directive. However, Dutch law continued to mandate civic integration courses and imposed fines for each failure. While Dutch law later changed to require passing these courses before obtaining long-term residence, this specific case focused on the previous iteration.

Judgment

The Court determined that requiring integration courses doesn’t inherently violate the Directive. Firstly, because the Directive explicitly permits imposing an integration condition before granting long-term resident status. Additionally, the Court found that this requirement didn’t breach the Directive’s equal treatment rule, given the presumption that Dutch nationals already possess knowledge of Dutch society and language, unlike non-EU citizens.

However, the Court’s analysis didn’t stop there. It examined whether these national rules compromised the Directive’s effectiveness. Since the Directive primarily aimed to integrate non-EU citizens, the Court argued that learning the local language and understanding the host state could enhance communication with Dutch citizens and foster social interaction. Additionally, acquiring Dutch language skills could improve job and training prospects. Therefore, the integration requirement aligned with the Directive’s objectives.

The Court emphasized certain limitations on Member States’ actions regarding “the level of knowledge required to pass the civic integration examination,” accessibility of courses and study materials, registration fees, and “specific individual circumstances, such as age, illiteracy or level of education.” However, the Court expressed particular concern over the fines, which were substantial and imposed for every failure or even for not taking the exam within the stipulated time frame. These fines were added on top of already high exam fees. Consequently, this aspect of the system potentially infringed on EU law, although the national court was left to implement the Court’s ruling practically. Finally, the Court deemed it irrelevant whether the individuals already possessed long-term resident status, as it wasn’t a prerequisite for obtaining or maintaining that status in this specific instance.

Comments

The Court’s ruling clarifies that Member States can, in principle, set integration requirements for long-term residency, as long as they adhere to the principle of effectiveness. In this case, the primary concern regarding effectiveness was the cumulative cost of fines for failing or missing the exam, combined with the exam fees themselves. This ruling compels the Dutch government to reduce these costs, and it opens the door for challenging similar regulations in other Member States based on the same grounds. This decision is particularly significant for less affluent migrants who might struggle to afford repeated fines and exam fees.

Although the Court didn’t elaborate extensively on other limitations EU law imposes on national integration requirements, such limitations undoubtedly exist. These include the required level of knowledge, accessibility of tests and materials, and consideration for “specific individual circumstances.” The judgment doesn’t precisely define how Member States should accommodate these circumstances - whether through complete exemption from the test or offering modified versions. It’s worth noting that the Court’s list of specific circumstances is not exhaustive.

While the judgment implies that Member States could potentially withhold long-term residence status for failing an integration test, the Court didn’t explicitly rule on this matter. This leaves room for arguments that stricter limitations or additional factors might apply when Member States link an integration condition to acquiring that status.

Furthermore, the Court didn’t address whether failing to fulfill an integration requirement could justify revoking long-term resident status. The Directive doesn’t list this as a valid reason for losing this status. Given the Directive’s objective, it follows that the list of grounds for losing status should be exhaustive. This interpretation also aligns with the Directive’s structure: if failing an integration test could lead to losing status, why did the drafters solely mention integration tests in the clause concerning the acquisition of that status?

This judgment is merely the first in a series of cases concerning integration conditions (with the next set focusing on the corresponding clause in the family reunification Directive). As a starting point, the Court has struck a balance between ensuring immigrants’ societal integration and preventing integration tests from becoming a concealed barrier that prevents migrants from genuinely integrating despite their sincere efforts.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0