Alan S. Reid, Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University. The author welcomes comments on the blog at a.s.reid@shu.ac.uk
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union has significant consequences for both entities and raises crucial questions about their future relationship. These questions include the potential independence of Scotland and its EU membership, calls for a unified Ireland, the potential spread of Euroscepticism in the EU, and the future of the 27-member bloc.
Amidst these broader issues, a pressing legal question is the process of extracting the UK from the EU legal framework. This process, outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, is relatively new, having been in effect only since 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon. Its lack of precedent and inherent ambiguity add to the complexity of the situation.
This article delves into the historical development of the withdrawal clause, tracing it back to the drafting of the European Constitution. The initial reluctance to include such a clause stemmed from a desire to present the European project as an irreversible “ever closer union.” However, growing discontent with EU integration, exemplified by Ireland’s rejection of the Treaty of Nice, forced the European Community to acknowledge the need for an exit mechanism.
The eventual inclusion of Article 50 in the Lisbon Treaty established a legal pathway for member states to leave the EU. However, this has not stopped some Brexit proponents from claiming alternative routes exist. They propose using Article 48, the treaty amendment process, or Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which allows withdrawal under specific conditions. A more extreme proposition is the outright repeal of the European Communities Act 1972, the legislation that integrated the UK into the European Community.
This article argues that relying on Article 48 is not a viable option, citing the example of Greenland’s exit from the European Economic Community in the 1980s. Greenland’s situation, as a constituent country within Denmark rather than a member state, makes it an unsuitable precedent. Similarly, invoking Article 54 of the Vienna Convention is deemed inappropriate given the existence of a specific withdrawal mechanism within EU law.
The article then examines the proposal to repeal the 1972 Act. While acknowledging the UK Parliament’s sovereignty, the author cautions against the legal and political instability that such a move would create. The intricate integration of EU law into the UK legal framework over 43 years makes disentanglement a complex and potentially damaging process. Such unilateral action would also undermine the UK’s international standing and could lead to legal challenges at both the EU and international levels.
The article then delves into the complexities of the Article 50 process itself. It argues that triggering Article 50 requires a clear and constitutionally sound decision by the UK, which might necessitate Parliamentary approval. This is particularly crucial given the non-binding nature of the referendum and the absence of a clear mandate for a specific post-Brexit relationship.
The author then examines the potential legal challenges that could arise during the two-year negotiation period stipulated by Article 50. Disputes over the interpretation and application of EU law could be brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), highlighting the irony of the Leave campaign’s reliance on the very institution they sought to escape.
Finally, the article explores the domestic legal challenges to triggering Article 50 without Parliamentary approval. The debate centers on the use of the royal prerogative, a historical power vested in the UK government to conduct foreign affairs. The author examines the arguments for and against using this power in the context of Brexit, concluding that while triggering Article 50 might fall under the royal prerogative, such a move would be constitutionally problematic.
The article concludes by emphasizing the unprecedented constitutional territory the UK finds itself in. The lack of clarity on the preferred post-Brexit relationship and the complexities of disentangling from the EU legal system necessitate a well-defined roadmap for the UK’s future relationship with Europe. Failing to do so risks jeopardizing the long-term interests of both the UK and the EU.
Conclusion
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has created significant uncertainty for both parties. While the process of the UK’s exit from the EU has just begun, its conclusion remains unclear.
Photo credit: Metro.co.uk