Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex
This piece examines the housing obligations of EU Member States toward asylum-seeking families. The European Court of Justice (CJEU) recently clarified the minimum standards required of Member States in its ruling on the Saciri case. The judgment is a positive development, confirming that regardless of the challenges Member States face in providing reception services for asylum-seekers, families cannot be left homeless or in extremely poor living conditions by denying them financial aid for housing.
Judgment
This case involved an asylum-seeking family (two parents and three children) in Belgium who required accommodation while their application was being processed. The Belgian reception agency stated they could not offer housing and referred the family to a social assistance agency. The Saciri family, unable to afford rent, requested financial aid from this agency.
The family, however, encountered a bureaucratic obstacle. The social assistance agency declined their request because they were not residing in accommodation provided by the reception agency—the very entity that had just turned them away. A Belgian lower court ruled that the reception agency was obligated to provide financial support. The agency appealed this decision, prompting the referring court to seek clarification from the CJEU regarding the EU’s initial reception conditions Directive.
The CJEU initially highlighted that the Directive allows for support for asylum-seekers through direct housing provisions or financial allowances. It then reaffirmed its earlier rulings (Cimade and GISTI) that benefits must be granted as soon as an asylum application is lodged, emphasizing the right to human dignity as outlined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Concerning the amount of financial aid, the CJEU stated that regardless of the support method, it must ensure a dignified standard of living, covering basic needs and healthcare. The Directive also requires Member States to consider individuals with special needs, including minors, which implies an obligation to maintain family unity and uphold the best interests of the child. The CJEU confirmed that these principles entitle applicants to secure housing in the private market if necessary, though this doesn’t grant them complete freedom in choosing their housing.
The CJEU clarified that although the Directive’s specific housing rules only apply when housing is directly provided by Member States, any allowances given for housing must still guarantee family unity.
Furthermore, the Court determined that in situations where accommodation facilities are full, Member States can refer asylum-seekers to public assistance authorities, as long as these authorities ensure adherence to the Directive’s minimum standards.
The Court emphasized in its conclusion that ‘saturation of the reception networks [is not] a justification for any derogation from meeting’ the Directive’s standards.
Comments
The CJEU’s judgment effectively addresses the ‘Catch-22’ arising from national law, which to some degree mirrors the structure of the Directive. The Directive outlines general rules for reception support but only provides detailed housing rules when the State directly furnishes the housing. This raises the question of what happens when the State cannot or chooses not to provide housing directly.
The Court’s response considers the Directive’s definition of ‘material reception conditions,’ which explicitly includes ‘housing.’ It logically follows that such material support must include help with securing housing when it’s not directly provided.
The Court’s judgment makes it abundantly clear that families seeking asylum have the right to receive support for obtaining family housing in the private market, although the Court acknowledges that asylum-seekers don’t have unlimited housing choice. This implies that if public housing is unavailable, authorities must ensure that asylum-seeking families receive sufficient support to afford rent at market rates for housing that can accommodate their family with dignity. This doesn’t mean they are entitled to lavish accommodations, but it does mean, for example, that a family of five cannot be expected to share a single sofa.
An overloaded reception system within a Member State does not impact the Court’s answers to these questions. Asylum-seekers might be referred to social assistance agencies instead of reception agencies and receive financial allowances instead of direct housing, but the fundamental obligation to provide adequate assistance for a minimum standard of dignified accommodation, including the preservation of family unity, remains non-negotiable.
Finally, it’s worth noting that the judgment adopts a more robust stance on family unity than the Directive’s wording. While the Directive states that family unity should be maintained ‘as far as possible’ and only when Member States provide direct housing, the Court’s judgment dictates that asylum-seeking families must be able to live together in all circumstances, even in private accommodations, even if this creates additional costs or administrative difficulties for Member States. This is a welcome outcome, as it represents a vital step towards safeguarding the family life of some of the most vulnerable individuals within the European Union.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 26