Is the EU's reaction to migrant fatalities focused on safeguarding and stopping them, or is it merely a way to disguise policy laundering?

Steve Peers

EU foreign and interior ministers recently agreed on a ten-point plan to address the tragic loss of migrant lives in the Mediterranean. While a summit and a new strategy are forthcoming, this initial plan is disappointing. It lacks crucial specifics and prioritizes border control and restrictive measures over aiding migrants facing perilous journeys and seeking safety.

This analysis will examine each of the plan’s ten points, followed by a look at the suggested “Australian solution” and the controversial “Christians only” approach. Alternative solutions from experts are also presented for consideration.

1. Reinforce Joint Operations: The plan proposes increased funding and resources for Mediterranean operations Triton and Poseidon. It aims to expand their operational reach for intervention, but within the existing mandate of Frontex, the EU’s border agency.

This measure, the only one directly addressing search and rescue, raises questions about its true objective. Frontex primarily deals with border control, not rescue efforts. The lack of clarity regarding search and rescue, the extent of resource allocation, and the expanded operational area raises concerns about the plan’s commitment to saving lives.

2. Target Smuggler Vessels: Inspired by the Atalanta operation against piracy in the Indian Ocean, the plan proposes a similar military operation to seize and demolish smuggler vessels in the Mediterranean.

This measure raises concerns about significant costs and the legal jurisdiction of EU Member States to destroy vessels in international waters.

3. Enhance Information Sharing: The plan calls for regular collaboration and information exchange between EU agencies like Europol, Frontex, EASO (asylum support), and Eurojust (prosecutors) to understand smuggler operations, track their finances, and aid investigations.

The inclusion of EASO, an agency with minimal involvement in such issues, raises concerns about diverting resources from its core functions.

4. Joint Asylum Processing: EASO teams would be deployed to Italy and Greece to assist with asylum applications, sharing the burden of these frontline states and potentially expediting processing times.

However, it remains unclear whether this will be simple support under existing rules or a shift towards joint processing by multiple states or EASO itself. The latter would necessitate new legislation.

5. Mandatory Fingerprinting: The plan mandates fingerprinting of all migrants.

While existing EU law already requires fingerprinting for various categories, including asylum seekers and those crossing borders unauthorized, this measure seems irrelevant to the issue of migrants drowning at sea. This appears to be a blatant attempt to push through an unrelated policy objective under the guise of addressing the migrant crisis.

6. Explore Emergency Relocation: The plan suggests exploring an emergency relocation mechanism to transfer asylum seekers or recognized refugees from overwhelmed frontline states to other member states.

This could alleviate pressure on countries like Malta, Italy, and Greece. However, it would require either amending the EU’s Dublin Regulation on asylum responsibility, which has been unsuccessful in the past, or relying on voluntary offers from member states, which have yielded limited results. The vague language suggests limited action in this area.

7. Voluntary Resettlement Pilot: The plan proposes a voluntary pilot project for resettling a limited number of individuals in need of protection within the EU.

This offers a form of “safe passage” to the EU, but the unspecified number of places and the pilot project’s temporary and limited nature, as per EU financial rules, raise concerns about its effectiveness.

8. Accelerated Returns: The plan calls for a new Frontex-coordinated program to expedite the return of irregular migrants from frontline states.

While EU law dictates that asylum seekers cannot be returned before a final decision on their application, this measure seemingly targets those whose applications are rejected or those who don’t apply and lack legal grounds to stay. The plan disregards the procedural rights of irregular migrants under the EU Returns Directive and asylum laws.

9. Engage with Libya and Niger: The plan suggests collaborating with countries neighboring Libya through joint efforts between the EU Commission and the European External Action Service. It also calls for strengthening initiatives in Niger.

However, the nature of this engagement remains unclear, raising questions about whether it will address the root causes of migration in origin and transit countries or focus solely on repressive measures like targeting smugglers.

10. Deploy Liaison Officers: Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) would be stationed in key third countries to gather intelligence on migration patterns and bolster the role of EU delegations.

While aiming to gather information, the plan provides no specifics on how the collected intelligence will be used.

The Australian Solution: Some argue for an EU adaptation of the “Australian solution,” involving intercepting migrant boats and returning them.

However, this oversimplifies Australia’s complex policy. It involves sending asylum seekers to Pacific islands for processing and potential resettlement with significant financial compensation to host countries. Australia justifies this as preventing queue-jumping and complements it with a generous resettlement program and indefinite detention for unauthorized arrivals.

Legal obstacles exist for the EU to adopt such a policy. The European Court of Human Rights prohibits returning migrants to unsafe third countries, and the EU Returns Directive forbids indefinite detention.

Furthermore, finding countries willing to host large numbers of migrants for compensation would be challenging for the EU, given the significantly higher number of migrants involved compared to the Australian context.

Finally, advocates often overlook Australia’s generous resettlement program, which, if scaled to the EU, would be far more substantial than current proposals.

Christians Only: The notion of prioritizing Christian asylum seekers, based on the flawed premise that they have “no other place to go,” is discriminatory and impractical.

The UN Refugee Convention prohibits discrimination based on religion, and many non-Christians also face persecution. Contrary to claims, many Arab and Muslim-majority countries have significant Christian populations living peacefully.

Implementing such a policy would involve unethical and logistically impossible scenarios, such as separating migrants based on religion or conducting religious tests.

Concluding Thoughts: The EU’s plan reveals a concerning lack of focus on the humanitarian crisis and the root causes of migration. It prioritizes border control and restrictive measures while neglecting the plight of those fleeing desperate circumstances.

The lack of emphasis on search and rescue, the limited scope of safe passage options, and the focus on expulsion raise concerns about the EU’s commitment to saving lives and upholding its humanitarian obligations.

The proposed measures, such as military intervention and intelligence gathering, also raise questions about the efficient allocation of resources.

Ultimately, the plan reflects a concerning focus on controlling migration rather than addressing its underlying causes and treating migrants with the dignity and respect they deserve.

 Art credit: Alex Falco Chang

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0