Steve Peers
A common saying in American politics, “only Nixon could go to China,” suggests that only a politician with a well-established reputation can persuade their base to accept a major policy shift. Nixon, a staunch anti-Communist, was able to convince American conservatives that engaging with Communist China was in their best interest. This principle might apply to the European Union as well. The recent European Parliament (EP) elections saw a rise in support for anti-EU parties in several Member States. This has led some, including David Cameron, to argue against Jean-Claude Juncker as the next European Commission President. They claim that Juncker, the preferred candidate of the European People’s Party (EPP), the party that won the most seats, is not reform-minded enough because he is too entrenched in EU politics. However, one could argue that reforming the EU might require a candidate who understands the current system and how to navigate it effectively.
Another argument against Juncker’s appointment challenges the very idea of basing the Commission President selection on the nomination of the party with the most EP seats. Some consider this approach fundamentally flawed, while others deem it undemocratic and unethical. A more balanced perspective recognizes the flaws in both these stances. The Treaty’s authors designed a system with dual legitimacy for selecting the President, granting the European Parliament a more prominent role than before.
This piece will elaborate on both arguments below. First, some background on this topic, which has received limited media attention until recently.
Background
Historically, the heads of state and government of EU Member States unanimously chose the Commission President. This national veto was eventually removed, and the European Council, composed of these leaders, now votes on the matter by qualified majority. The European Parliament also gained the authority to approve the President nominee, though they have never rejected one.
The Treaty of Lisbon maintained this process but framed it differently. Article 17 TEU now states that the Parliament “elects” the Commission President. However, the European Council still nominates the candidate, though the Treaty now requires them to “take into account” the EP election results.
After the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, most EU political parties (EPP, Socialists, Greens, Left party, and Liberals) agreed to nominate their preferred Commission President candidate, assuming the nominee from the party with the most seats would become President after the elections. These party nominees became known as ‘Spitzenkandidaten’. However, it remained unclear whether the European Council would accept this process.
The procedure for selecting the Commission President
A previous post on this blog, published before the elections, argued that despite valid concerns about the Spitzenkandidaten concept, it should be supported as a step toward democratizing the EU.
Let’s revisit this argument in light of the post-election debate. Some claim that only the European Council or the European Parliament should hold democratic authority in this process. However, neither view is convincing.
First, consider the legal perspective. The Treaty clearly grants the European Council a role alongside the European Parliament in the process of electing a Commission President. The Treaty of Lisbon’s drafters could have easily removed the European Council’s role entirely if they intended. Instead, they maintained their involvement in selecting the President nominee.
Conversely, the Treaty’s authors not only preserved but also strengthened the European Parliament’s role. They included references to the Parliament “electing” the President and requiring the European Council to consider the election results. These revisions demonstrate their intent to empower the EP. Therefore, it is best understood that both institutions play a crucial role in appointing the Commission President, with the EP now taking a more prominent role than the European Council.
Furthermore, from a broader political standpoint, claiming that only the EP or the European Council embodies EU democracy is absurd. Both possess democratic legitimacy, as recognized by Article 10(2) TEU. This article highlights the direct representation of citizens in the European Parliament and their indirect representation, through national parliaments and governments, in the European Council (and the Council of national ministers).
This dual legitimacy is evident throughout EU law, including the ordinary legislative procedure, the annual budget process, the European Parliament’s consent power over certain Council acts (like most treaties), and both the EP’s and Council’s power to control delegated acts adopted by the Commission. In some cases, the Council holds more power (e.g., tax legislation), while in others, the EP does (e.g., only the EP can force the entire Commission to resign, aligning with their increased influence in the appointment process). Therefore, a successful Commission President must have broad support from both the European Parliament and the Member States.
What are the practical implications? The European Parliament’s enhanced role in electing the Commission President should be acknowledged. The European Council should prioritize the Spitzenkandidat most likely to secure a majority vote from Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Given his party’s majority win and the support from a significant number of EP parties for him to seek a majority, Juncker is the frontrunner.
However, under the current EU system, the European Council should not automatically approve this candidate. They retain the right to seek specific commitments to assure a broad majority of Member States that the candidate is the right choice.
Considering the rise of anti-European parties, it is reasonable to expect the next Commission President to commit to substantial EU reforms. This raises the question: is Juncker, perceived by some as a federalist promoting greater European integration, the right person for the job?
Can Juncker be a reformist?
To determine Juncker’s reformist potential, we can start by reviewing his own list of five priorities. These priorities include a commitment to discuss a possible renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership, directly referencing David Cameron’s own set of demands (discussed in an earlier blog post). Simultaneously, Juncker advocates for a more prominent EU role in monetary union, but only for Eurozone members, specifically excluding the UK.
Another priority is finalizing the ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement between the EU and the United States. This proposal faces growing controversy (at least within the EU), and its merits are difficult to assess without knowing the final agreement’s details. However, this agreement seems to have widespread support across the UK’s political spectrum. If successful, it would undermine the claim that the UK needs to leave the EU to enhance trade with non-EU countries. Conversely, failure to reach an agreement would lend credence to such arguments, at least partially (the EU has successfully negotiated, and is currently negotiating, free trade agreements with many other countries).
Juncker’s support for an EU/US free trade deal comes with caveats, particularly regarding food safety and data protection laws. However, these concerns are shared by several national capitals and parliaments, as well as among numerous MEPs. Addressing these concerns is crucial for any trade agreement to stand a chance of ratification. A more enthusiastic and less critical supporter of an EU/US trade agreement might struggle to persuade as many governments or parliamentarians to back the final deal. Specifically, the European Parliament might now house more MEPs opposing a potential deal. However, Juncker, as the first Spitzenkandidat to assume office, might be best positioned to advocate for its support.
Juncker’s remaining two priorities focus on growth-oriented policies, such as the digital single market and an EU energy union. Both enjoy broad support across the EU and are not inherently federalist. The EU single market’s development has always been a central reason for the Conservative party’s support of the EU.
Contrary to some claims, Juncker’s priorities are not overly federalist and already incorporate some reform elements. Further reform is undoubtedly needed. The next Commission must prioritize EU transparency, devolve more power to Member States where appropriate, and address other public concerns.
Therefore, the European Council should request concrete commitments from Juncker on these issues. However, it’s important to remember that the Commission President is not the sole authority in EU politics. Any proposed legislation requires approval from both the EP and the Council. More broadly, Member States dictate the overall political direction of the EU during European Council meetings, and they have complete control over appointing the President of that body (Herman van Rompuy’s term ends after November 1, 2014, making him ineligible for reappointment).
Political innovation is always a possibility. For example, the European Council could establish a high-level group, potentially including figures like Tony Blair and Nicolas Sarkozy, tasked with delivering a report with specific recommendations for EU reform shortly. Juncker could be asked to commit to a strong role for a (British?) Vice-President of the Commission, specifically responsible for overseeing the reform process. A more concrete step could involve the European Council and the EP agreeing on a set of common rules, formalized through a joint statement or inter-institutional agreement, outlining their respective roles in the Commission President selection process.
To effectively implement EU reforms, a Commission President with strong ties to the European Parliament might be more successful in garnering support for policies within that institution. An experienced figure in EU politics would be better equipped to navigate the complexities of the system compared to a newcomer. Juncker possesses both strong connections within the EP and extensive intergovernmental experience. Acknowledging that sometimes, “only Nixon could go to China,” might be the key to resolving the ongoing controversy surrounding his potential appointment.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 3