It’s doubtful the European Court of Justice will decide the next European Commission President. Election laws typically set the stage but don’t directly determine the winner, although there are notable exceptions like the 2000 US election.
The 2014 Commission President election is unique because the rules changed, and their interpretation is debated. Previously, the European Council appointed the President after European Parliament approval. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced new rules, applied for the first time, stating the Parliament “elects” the President based on the Council’s nomination, “taking account” of Parliament election results.
Seemingly, not much has changed, as the European Council has operated since 1999 assuming the Commission President aligns politically with the Parliament’s largest party. However, most European political parties believe the Treaty amendments mean they should nominate their President before elections, and the party with the most seats should see their candidate win.
This belief stems from the rule change and the fundamental idea that linking Parliament elections to the Commission President selection enhances the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Voters would choose the EU executive like national parliamentary elections determine executives in parliamentary systems.
However, this interpretation is disputed. The ECR party (AECR during elections), including British Conservatives, won’t name a candidate, rejecting the link between Parliament elections and Commission President selection, instead running national campaigns. The EFD party, including the UK Independence Party, will also not name a candidate. Angela Merkel doesn’t accept an automatic link between EP elections and the President nomination. The UK Labour party, while agreeing with parties nominating candidates, doesn’t support the Party of European Socialists’ nominee.
The ECR party believes letting Parliament elections decide the Commission President lacks democratic legitimacy, citing no public demand and asserting national governments should primarily legitimize EU policies. A critique by Heather Grabbe and Stephan Lehne for the Centre for European Reform also raises several objections.
Post-election Possibilities
Predicting political outcomes is risky, but it’s necessary here because a “partisan” Commission President’s merit depends on assumptions about the next appointment. The Grabbe/Lehne paper presents three scenarios: (a) the EP prevails, and the Council proposes the largest party’s candidate without objection; (b) deadlock between Parliament and Council over the appointment; and (c) a behind-the-scenes deal is made. Writing in October 2013, (c) seemed likely; now, the European People’s Party is less likely to win the most seats and will nominate a candidate.
A messy deadlock is still possible. Due to proportional representation voting mandated by EU Treaties, no single party will hold a majority after May’s Parliament elections. To reject the Council’s nominee, the winning party needs support from others. They’ll also need support to elect their President, assuming the Council even proposes them. If not, deadlock looms.
However, the Parliament has always sought a larger role in Commission appointments, holding hearings for nominees even before their influence grew. When the last two Commissions were appointed, the Parliament rejected individual nominees despite no Treaty provision allowing it. Therefore, if necessary, a majority might veto any President candidate not nominated by the largest party, and the Council would likely acknowledge this reality. Effectively, the Council would become like a constitutional monarch, similar to Queen Elizabeth II, in appointing the Commission President.
Is Choosing the Commission President Through European Parliament Elections a Good Idea?
Just because it seems increasingly likely doesn’t mean it’s beneficial. Let’s examine arguments from Grabbe/Lehne about its potential impact on the Commission’s effectiveness. Firstly, they argue that a “partisan” President couldn’t perform effectively due to the Commission’s objective tasks, including economic governance, state aids, competition, human rights, and infringement actions. Secondly, a President elected via EP elections might not be a strong leader, hindering collaboration with national governments. Thirdly, beholden to the EP, the President’s initiatives could be blocked by the Council, creating legislative gridlock similar to the US system. Fourthly, with Member States choosing other Commissioners, a President from one party might face a majority of Commissioners from opposing backgrounds.
The second set of arguments concerns the concept’s legitimacy and democratic credentials. Grabbe/Lehne’s argument overlaps with the ECR’s stance. Both argue that the EP is detached from constituents and that strengthening the link to the Commission President selection won’t change this due to the candidates’ lack of recognition.
These are generally valid arguments, so let’s analyze them individually. First, many of the Commission’s technical tasks have been delegated to EU agencies, leaving legislation proposal as its primary function. Clearly, political choices influence proposed legislation and its implementation. State aid and competition decisions, bound by objective rules, can be challenged in court, and the Commission’s infringement actions must be argued there. If the President were “partisan,” establishing mechanisms to separate less political decision-making from political choices would be wise, but not impossible, as seen in the European Central Bank’s separation of banking supervision (politically accountable) from its independent central bank role. Regardless, Grabbe/Lehne’s argument ignores that since 1999, the President has been chosen from the party with the most EP seats without demonstrably impacting the Commission’s technical work.
Second, while the next President likely won’t be a former Prime Minister (unlike the last three), this doesn’t guarantee effectiveness: the most effective Presidents (Hallstein and Delors) were not Prime Ministers, while the least effective (Santer) was. This argument assumes neither Member States nor the President will work effectively with the other, which seems unlikely given the EU’s history of seeking consensus among institutions. Similarly, regarding the third argument, any President understands their initiatives require at least a qualified majority in the Council.
The fourth argument (the Commission’s partisan mix) is perhaps the most compelling. To make a comparison, it’s difficult for British Conservatives to accept governing with a minority of Liberal Democrats in the cabinet. How could a government function with David Cameron as Prime Minister and a Labour party majority in the cabinet?
The answer lies in the EU institutions’ pursuit of internal consensus. The diverse political makeup of Member State governments means Commissioners have always come from various backgrounds. Additionally, Grabbe/Lehne overlooks Treaty provisions strengthening the President’s influence: requiring Commissioners to work under their guidance and allowing the President to dismiss individual Commissioners. The added legitimacy of indirectly electing the President would only amplify this. As previously mentioned, the President will need multi-party support for election anyway. A more radical solution would be for the EP to expect parties to nominate a full Commission team. This has yet to occur.
Concerning political legitimacy, the ECR’s poll justifying their decision not to run a candidate was revealing. While many voters criticized the EU’s legitimacy and didn’t know the President candidates, more respondents liked the idea of EP election results determining the President, believing it would make the EU more democratic. This was particularly true in Poland, where 50% supported the idea and only 19% opposed it. Support was also found in France, Italy, and Spain, but opposed in Germany and the UK, explaining the Conservative (and perhaps Labour) positions. Despite this, the poll indicates that many who find the EU lacking legitimacy would appreciate increased legitimacy through indirectly electing the President. After all, how many people knew Barroso in February 2004, or Obama in January 2008?
Ultimately, the need to forge a stronger democratic link between EU citizens and the Union is the decisive argument for indirect elections. While the concept has flaws, the existing EU system can adapt, as explained above. Those flaws are outweighed by the opportunity to democratize the EU and give voters a chance, however indirect, to (in Weiler’s words) “throw the rascals out.” This doesn’t necessitate a more centralized EU. The debate on the EU’s future would have benefited from, for example, John Major presenting the ECR’s case for a less centralized, less regulated EU focused on free trade.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 3