Steve Peers

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), through its judgment in the Ruffer case, reinforced and broadened its stance on using minority languages in legal processes.

The case involved Mrs. Ruffer, a German citizen residing in Germany, who was injured in a skiing incident in Bolzano, Italy, a region where German is commonly spoken. She held Ms. Pokoma, a Czech citizen living in the Czech Republic, responsible for the accident and filed a lawsuit against her in the Italian courts. This was likely because, according to EU regulations on jurisdiction, Italy was where the incident occurred. Mrs. Ruffer chose German as the language for the proceedings, and Ms. Pokoma did not object.

While Italian law allows German in Bolzano court proceedings, a higher national court ruled that this right was exclusively for Italian residents of Bolzano. As a result, the civil proceedings were invalidated. The referring court questioned the CJEU if this aligned with EU law, particularly given the Court’s earlier decision in Bickel and Franz. In that case, the Court had determined that Austrian citizens passing through Bolzano could, as EU citizens, invoke the right to non-discrimination based on nationality to demand the use of German in criminal cases.

The CJEU stated that the Bickel and Franz judgment was relevant to civil proceedings, as otherwise, it would differentiate between Italian citizens in Bolzano and German-speaking citizens from other member states. The Court refuted the Italian government’s argument that national courts couldn’t handle this expansion of language rights, as the referring court had claimed otherwise. Similarly, the Court rejected the argument that more German usage would increase costs, deeming it unacceptable in the context of EU citizenship.

Comments

The ruling isn’t unexpected considering the Court’s stance in Bickel and Franz. However, its ramifications and background require further analysis.

Firstly, it’s crucial to understand that the EU’s non-discrimination principle concerning minority languages hinges on how a Member State handles these languages. EU law ensures non-discrimination based on nationality, not the minority language rights themselves. Whether a Member State grants such rights is mainly determined by its national laws and international obligations, not EU law. However, discrimination against minority languages could be considered indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, which is prohibited by the EU’s Race Discrimination Directive.

Secondly, the EU law principle intersects with the ’national minority’ concept as defined by international treaties on minority rights. In this case, the parties involved aren’t Italian nationals nor, in their own countries, members of a minority language group (assuming Ms. Pokoma speaks German as a second language).

Thirdly, the language rights in these instances surpass the rights ensured by Article 6(3)(e) ECHR, as applied by the EU Directive on interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. This is because they involve civil, not criminal, proceedings and concern the primary language used, not just interpretation or translation.

Fourthly, the Court’s refusal to restrict its prior judgments solely to criminal proceedings implies that any rights (not just those linked to legal actions) a Member State grants to its language minorities should, in principle, be available to other Member States’ nationals. This applies even when the language in question is (as in Mrs. Ruffer’s case) the dominant language of that person’s home country. However, arguments about administrative burdens might be better supported in a different case.

Fifthly, the right is not contingent on residing in the Member State involved. Logically, even if neither party had been to Bolzano but EU regulations required the proceedings to occur there, the equal treatment principle would still hold. However, for other aspects of minority language rights like education and administrative communication, equal treatment might hinge on achieving sufficient integration within the Member State, at least through residency.

Lastly, while the CJEU dismissed the cost argument legally, it could hold political weight. National or regional politicians might use these judgments to argue against expanding or maintaining minority language rights due to the cost of extending them to other Member States’ nationals. This would be a regrettable and unintended consequence of the Court’s rulings.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 13